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Ernest E. Figari, Jr.,*
Thomas A. Graves,** and A. Erin Dwyer***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions, statutory enact-
ments,1 and amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.2
This Article examines these developments and considers their impact on ex-
isting Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Adams v. Calloway,3 following a similar holding of an earlier case,4 sus-
tained the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court to adjudicate a claim for
wrongful death against an administrator. Generally, section 5(d) of the
Texas Probate Code5 authorizes a statutory probate court to hear all matters
"incident to an estate" and, according to section 5A(b),6 all claims "against"
estates fall within this grant. Interpreting section 5A(b) literally, the Corpus
Christi court of appeals concluded that a tort claim against an estate must be
brought in the probate court where the estate is being administered.
7
Two other cases, Pullen v. Swanson8 and Bank of the Southwest v. Stehle,9
* B.S., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist
University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. The enactments that have procedural implications principally concern jurisdiction of
the County Courts at Law of Dallas County, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-3 (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1965-1985), and the award of attorneys' fees, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.156
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1985).
2. As a result of the amendments, 137 rules were modified, 16 new rules were added, and
66 rules were repealed. These changes became effective Apr. 1, 1984. See Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 47 TEX. B.J. (Feb. 1984) (special pull-out section).
3. 662 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
4. Seay v. Hall, 663 S.W.2d 468, 470-71 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ), discussed in
Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 421,
422 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Annual Survey].
Editor's Note: The Texas Supreme Court subsequently granted writ of error in Seay and
affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. Seay v. Hall, 677
S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
5. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980).
6. Id. § 5A(b).
7. 662 S.W.2d at 426-27.
8. 667 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
9. 660 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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considered the scope of the "incident to an estate" language. Faced with a
suit brought in district court to collect from an executrix on certain promis-
sory notes signed by the decedent, the court in Pullen concluded that the
claims were incident to the decedent's estate, ruling that the suit should be
decided by the probate court before whom the estate was pending. 10 In
Stehle a plaintiff brought suit in a district court where certain realty owned
by an estate was located, seeking to enforce against the estate's representa-
tive an option to purchase the realty. Concluding that the claim was one
incident to the estate, the San Antonio court of appeals reversed a judgment
in the plaintiff's favor. 1' Joining the holding of an earlier case,12 the court in
Stehle also concluded that the statutory probate court has exclusive jurisdic-
tion of a claim incident to the estate. A district court therefore lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate such a claim. 13
A later case, Farah v. Fashing,14 suggested that the "incident to an estate"
language of section 5(d) has limits. In a proceeding initiated by two benefi-
ciaries to contest their administrator's final accounting, the administrator
asserted a third-party claim for malpractice against the attorneys who had
represented him in the matter, seeking indemnity and contribution. On
mandamus review of the probate court's dismissal of the third-party claim,
the appellate court reasoned that in order for the third-party claim to be
incident to the estate, its outcome must be necessary to the resolution of the
estate.15 The court concluded that the claim could not be so categorized,
and upheld the dismissal.16
Article 1970-3,17 which indirectly controls the subject matter jurisdiction
of all the County Courts at Law of Dallas County, 18 was recently amended.
The statute now authorizes county courts to hear civil matters in which the
amount in controversy exceeds $500, exclusive of interest, and does not ex-
ceed twenty thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, mandatory damages and
penalties, attorney's fees, and costs. 19 Hence, in cases in which the matter in
controversy falls within this jurisdictional range these county courts share
10. 667 S.W.2d at 362; see English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. 1979).
11. 660 S.W.2d at 574.
12. Boman v. Howell, 618 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
13. 660 S.W.2d at 574; see Seay v. Hall, 663 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983),
afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984). But see Pullen v. Swanson, 667
S.W.2d 359, 362-63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
14. 666 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
15. Id. at 342; see Lucik v. Taylor, 596 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. 1980).
16. 666 S.W.2d at 343.
17. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1985).
18. See id. art. 1970-16, 1970-3 1.1, § 2 (Vernon 1964), 1970-31.2, § 2 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1965-1985).
19. Id. art. 1970-3, § 2 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1985). In past years similar changes
have been made to the jurisdiction of county courts at law in other counties. See, e.g., id. arts.
1970-33(b), 1970-62.2, § 2(c) (Tarrant County); 1970-112, 1970-126a, § 2, 1970-126b, § 2(b)
(Jefferson County); 1970-166d, § 2(b), 1970-166e, § 2(b) (Wichita County); 1970-112a, § l(b)
(Harris County); 1970-305, § 2(b), 1970-305c, § 2(d) (Cameron County); 1970-324, § 2, 1970-
324a, § 2, 1970-324a.1, § 1, 1970-324a.2, § 2 (Travis County); and 1970-339, § 3a, 1970-339A,
§ 3a, 1970-339c, § l(d), 1970-339D, § 2(c) (Nueces County).
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concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts.20
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, article 2031b, 21 continued to be
the subject of judicial measurement. Section 3 of article 203 lb provides that
when a nonresident "engages in business in this State," the statute authorizes
service of a nonresident "in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of
such business."' 22 For a brief period, the "arising out of' language raised
questions as to the ability of a plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction
under article 203 lb on nonresidents on the basis of activities unrelated to the
asserted cause of action. 23 The Texas Supreme Court, however, has now
settled that the Texas long-arm statute reaches as far as due process will
permit and that business contacts unrelated to the asserted cause of action
will support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under article 2031b.24
Proceeding from this point, the United States Supreme Court in Hall v.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 25 articulated a due process test
for the situation in which unrelated contacts are relied upon to sustain per-
sonal jurisdiction under article 203 lb. The plaintiffs, survivors of four indi-
viduals killed in the crash of a helicopter in Peru, sued a Colombian
corporation in a wrongful death action and effected service under article
2031b. Neither the individuals killed in the crash nor their representatives
were residents of, or had any contacts with, Texas. A joint venture that had
employed the persons killed was engaged in the construction of a pipeline in
Peru and, in connection with the project, had contracted with the defendant
to furnish helicopter transportation service in that country. The contract
was partially negotiated in Texas, but the defendant executed the contract in
Peru. Further, the contract provided that the parties to it were to be subject
to the forum and laws of Peru. Although monies due the defendant under
the contract originated from a Texas bank, they were sent to the defendant
in either New York or Panama.
Aside from the negotiation session, the defendant had purchased a major
portion of its helicopter fleet from a manufacturer based in Texas and had
20. Id. art. 1970-3, § 2.
21. Id. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Pam. Supp. 1964-1985).
22. Id. § 3 (Vernon 1964).
23. See Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 285 (5th Cir. 1982) (cause of action for libel does
not arise out of nonresident contacts if not published in forum state); Jim Fox Enters., Inc. v.
Air France, 664 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1981) (no personal jurisdiction when nonresident was
never in forum in connection with cause of action); Placid Invs., Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank,
662 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981) (long-arm statute does not reach foreign corporation with
substantial business in forum when claim does not relate to such business), vacated on rehear-
ing, 689 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th
Cir. 1981) (requirements of long-arm statute not met where substantial activities in forum had
no causal relation to cause of action), discussed in Figari, Graves & Gordon, Texas Civil Proce-
dure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 435, 436-37 (1982).
24. Hall v. Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984); see Placid Invs., Ltd. v. Girard
Trust Bank, 689 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1982), vacating 662 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).
1985]
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sent prospective pilots and other personnel there to be trained at the manu-
facturer's facility. The defendant had no other contacts with Texas. The
Supreme Court reiterated that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident may
be sustained on the basis of unrelated contacts without offending due pro-
cess; however, the Court emphasized that, in such a situation, the unrelated
contacts must be continuous and systematic.2 6 The Court in Hall concluded
that the defendant's contacts were insufficient to satisfy this test.27
The Fifth Circuit in C&H Transportation Co. v. Jensen & Reynolds Con-
struction Co.28 reiterated a two-pronged test for meeting the requirements of
due process when effecting service under article 203 lb. First, "[t]he defend-
ant must have some minimum contacts with the state resulting from an af-
firmative act or acts on its part" and, second, "it must not be unfair or
unreasonable to require the nonresident defendant to defend the suit in the
forum." 2 9
The plaintiff, a motor carrier based in Texas, sued the defendant, a Louisi-
ana corporation, to collect the balance of freight charges due for transporta-
tion services in the movement of crane parts from Louisiana to Washington.
In the course of an interstate conference call the defendant, who was located
in Washington at the time, informed the plaintiff where the parts were to be
transported. Thereafter, the parts were picked up and transported through
Texas to their destination in Washington. After the haul was completed, the
defendant mailed a $30,000 check to the plaintiff in Texas, and a dispute
ensued as to whether an additional sum was owed for the services. Pointing
to "[t]he mere use of interstate commerce on a single occasion involving the
forum, the fortuitous routing of equipment through the forum on the way to
its destination in Washington, and the mailing of a payment check to the
forum, ' ' 30 the court concluded that purposeful availment of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum had not been shown.3 1 Emphasizing that the de-
fendant's sole contact with Texas was the single, isolated transaction
involved, the court found the first element of the two-pronged test to be
lacking and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit.3 2
When the registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in Texas cannot be found, article 8.10 of the Texas Business Corpo-
ration Act 33 authorizes service to be effected over the corporation by deliver-
ing two copies of the process to the secretary of state. Acording to article
26. Id. at 1873, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411-12; see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 438 (1952).
27. 104 S. Ct. at 1874, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 414.
28. 719 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 1269; accord Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026,
1028 (5th Cir. 1983) (not unfair or unreasonable to require nonresident corporation to defend
suit in Texas since contracts were made in Texas and would be governed by Texas law); South-
west Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1980) (exchange of
communication insufficient to be characterized as purposeful activity within the forum).
30. 719 F.2d at 1270.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.10(B) (Vernon 1980).
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8.10, the secretary of state "shall immediately cause one of such copies
thereof to be forwarded by registered mail, addressed to the corporation at
its principal office in the state or country under the laws of which it is incor-
porated."' 34 The Texas Supreme Court concluded during an earlier survey
period that service under article 203 lb is not completed until process is for-
warded by the designated state official to the nonresident defendant.35 In
order to establish the jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant's per-
son, the record must affirmatively show that the process was forwarded. 36
In Roland Communications, Inc. v. American Communications Corpus
Christi, Inc.37 this principle was applied to service attempted under article
8.10. Invoking article 8.10, the plaintiff had caused the secretary of state to
be served with two copies of the process; however, the record failed to show
that a copy of the process was forwarded to the defendant. Setting aside a
default judgment that had been entered on the basis of this service, the ap-
pellate court concluded that, as a result of this omission, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 38
C. W Brown Machine Shop, Inc. v. Stanley Machine Corp.39 indicated that
advertisement by a nonresident in a national publication that is circulated in
Texas will not of itself subject the nonresident to service under article 203 lb.
The plaintiff, a Texas resident, read an advertisement in a national publica-
tion sponsored by a Massachusetts corporation in the business of buying and
selling machinery and, as a result, became interested in purchasing one of
the items described. After requesting descriptive material concerning the
machine from the Massachusetts seller, the plaintiff traveled to Massachu-
setts to inspect and test the machine. Thereafter, the plaintiff purchased the
machine, the seller shipped it to Texas, and the plaintiff wired the purchase
price to the seller in Massachusetts. After discovering a defect in the
machine, the plaintiff initiated suit in Texas and served the seller under arti-
cle 203 1b. The court of appeals concluded that the seller's mere advertise-
ment in national publications circulated in Texas was insufficient to subject
its person to jurisdiction in the state and therefore affirmed a dismissal of the
suit.4o
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A number of significant changes were made in the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure with respect to service of process. Rule 108a,41 which is com-
pletely new and patterned after its federal counterpart, 42 provides several
34. Id.
35. Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973), discussed in Figari,
Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 248 (1974).
36. Id.
37. 662 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
38. Id. at 147; see Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935).
39. 670 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
40. Id. at 793-94; see Loumar v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1983). But see
Siskind v. Villa Foundation for Education, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Tex. 1982).
41. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108a.
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
1985]
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alternative procedures for serving a party in a foreign country. Specifically,
it authorizes service: (1) "in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign
country;"' 43 (2) "as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter
rogatory or a letter of request;" 44 (3) "in the manner provided by Rule
106,''45 which is the rule governing service generally in Texas;46 (4) "pursu-
ant to the terms and provisions of any applicable treaty or convention;" 47
(5) "by diplomatic or consular officials when authorized by the United States
Department of State;"'48 or (6) "by any other means directed by the court
that is not prohibited by the law of the country where service is to be
made."' 49 Regardless of the method chosen, the procedure used must be
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to give actual notice of
the proceedings to the defendant in time to answer and defend." 50 Intended
to permit acquisition of personal jurisdiction to the maximum limit, rule
108a authorizes service on the foreign defendant "to the full extent that he
may be required to appear and answer under the Constitution of the United
States or under any applicable convention or treaty in an action either in rem
or in personam." 51
To eliminate confusion as to whether service of a counterclaim or cross-
claim had to be by citation, amended rule 12452 now provides that "[w]hen a
party asserts a counter-claim or a cross-claim against another party who has
entered an appearance, the claim may be served in any manner prescribed
for service of citation or as provided in Rule 21(a)."' 53 Of course, rule 21(a)
permits service to be made by delivering a copy of the pleading to the party
to be served or to his agent or attorney, either in person or by registered
mail.54
Two decisions during the survey period invalidated service of process on
the basis of inadvertent errors occurring during the execution of service. In
Lewis v. Lewis55 an officer served a citation ninety-six days after its issuance
despite a stipulation in the citation that provided for a ninety-day limitation
on effectiveness. The defendant contended that the citation was void be-
43. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108a(1)(a); see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A).
44. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108a(1)(b); see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(l)(B).
45. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108a(l)(c).
46. Id. 106 directs that service is to be effected by the designated officer upon the defend-
ant either by personal delivery or by mailing the process in a prescribed manner to the defend-
ant. When securing service by either of these preferred methods is impractical, rule 106
authorizes the trial court, upon motion, to order substituted service upon the defendant by one
of several acceptable methods. See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure. Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 359, 364 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Annual Survey].




51. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 108; U-anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762
n. 1 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (intent of rule 108 is to secure in personam
jurisdiction to constitutional limits).
52. TEX. R. Civ. P. 124.
53. Id.
54. Id. 21(a).
55. 667 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, no writ).
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cause the officer failed to serve the citation within the ninety days, and
sought to set aside a default judgment rendered against him on the basis of
the service. 56 The court of appeals concluded that the time requirement
stated in the citation for effecting service was mandatory, held that the ser-
vice over the defendant consequently was ineffective, and invalidated the de-
fault judgment.57
A similar error occurred in Cates v. Pon,5 8 in which the trial court had
authorized a recognized method of substituted service under rule 106,59 di-
recting in its order that "service be performed by Leonard Green." 6 Subse-
quently deputy constable Lindsey E. Siriko effected substituted service.
After a default judgment was taken, the defendant challenged the service on
the basis of the substitution of process servers. The appellate court in setting
aside the default judgment followed a rule of strict compliance and found the
service to be fatally defective due to its variance from the service order.61
IV. VENUE
The recently adopted amendments to the Texas venue statute prohibit in-
terlocutory appeals of venue rulings. 62 Instead, the venue question is now
appealed together with any appeal from the trial on the merits.63 Not sur-
prisingly, only a handful of cases during the survey period even considered
venue questions, and most of those involved venue provisions as they existed
before the 1983 amendments."'
One case that may have continuing significance, notwithstanding the re-
cent amendments, is City of Fort Gates v. Cathey.65 In Cathey the defendant
filed a motion for change of venue asserting its inability to obtain an impar-
tial trial in the county where the action was pending. 66 The plaintiff re-
sponded to defendant's motion and affidavits by filing a controverting plea,
also supported by affidavits. The issue thus formed was tried to the judge,
who overruled the defendant's motion for a change of venue. On appeal, the
court held that defendant had shown no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court because it had failed to bring forward a statement of facts
56. Id. at 911; see TEx. R. Civ. P. 101.
57. 667 S.W.2d at 911; accord Kem v. Kruger, 626 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1981, no writ); Lemoth v. Cimbalista, 236 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1951, writ refd).
58. 663 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
60. 663 S.W.2d at 100.
61. Id. at 102.
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(d)(l) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1985); see
1984 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 433-34.
63. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(d)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1985).
64. See, e.g., Lane Wood, Inc. v. Grayco Mobile Homes, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
(Vernon Supp. 1985), venue of primary suit for negligence controls venue of indemnity or
contribution claim against third-party defendant). Of course, article 1995 now provides that
venue of the main action shall establish venue of a properly joined third-party claim in all
cases. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1985).
65. 665 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Id. at 589; see TEx. R. Civ. P. 257-259.
1985]
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from the trial court's hearing on the motion. 67 Unfortunately, the appellate
court's decision does not reveal whether the defendant's motion was filed
before or after the effective date of the amendments to rule 258.68 The
amended version of that rule arguably permits the trial court to make its
determination solely on the basis of the affidavits, in which case a statement
of facts from the hearing should not be required on appeal.
69
In at least one other case, the appellate court may also have failed to con-
sider a recent amendment to the controlling venue provision. In Red Bird
Bank v. Crocker National Bank70 the court sustained the defendant's special
appearance challenging venue, holding that the defendant had not waived
the venue protections of section 94 of the National Bank Act,7' which had
restricted the venue of such suits against national banks to the county of the
bank's principal place of business.72 In reaching this conclusion, the court
apparently overlooked the Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which lim-
ited the scope of the national bank venue privilege by confining its applica-
tion to national banks for which a receiver has been appointed. 73 In line
with the prevailing authorities on the subject, the court also held that a spe-
cial appearance is a proper means of raising federal venue issues in a Texas
state court lawsuit.74
V. PLEADINGS
The pleading requirements for actions on sworn accounts have changed
substantially. Rule 185 previously provided that a defendant was required
to file a written denial under oath stating that each and every item of the
sworn account claim was not just or true or that some specific items were not
just or true.75 The new rule simply requires that the party resisting a sworn
account claim "file a written denial, under oath."' 76 Further, the rule speci-
fies that "[n]o particularization or description of the nature of the compo-
nent parts of the account or claim is necessary," unless a special exception is
sustained to the petition.77 With respect to counterclaims and cross-claims,
rule 92 now provides that, in the absence of a responsive pleading to a cross-
67. 665 S.W.2d at 589; see Englander v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1968).
68. 665 S.W.2d at 589; TEX. R. Civ. P. 258. The amendments became effective on Sept.
1, 1983, more than a year before the court's decision.
69. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 258 (challenge of change of venue motion determined by
affidavit), with Tex. R. Civ. P. 258 (Vernon 1976) (if change of venue motion challenged by
affidavit, judge can determine issues formed by trial).
70. 667 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).
72. 667 S.W.2d at 886.
73. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 406, 96 Stat. 1512-13 (1982) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976))
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1982)). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Proce-
dure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 265, 299 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Annual Survey].
74. 667 S.W.2d at 887; see, e.g., New Jersey Bank v. Knuckley, 637 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.
1982); Stephenson v. Walker, 593 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980,
no writ).
75. Tex. R. Civ. P. 185 (Vernon 1976).




claim or counterclaim, a party shall be deemed to have pleaded a general
denial to the counterclaim or cross-claim, but shall not have waived any
special appearance or plea of privilege as a result. 78
Two cases during the survey period addressed issues related to pleadings.
In Dawson v. Garcia79 the plaintiffs sought to recover damages and "such
other and further relief to which they may be entitled either at law or in
equity."'80 In the light of the absence of the word "interest" in the prayer for
relief, the Dallas court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had waived
their right to record prejudgment interest. 81 The Dawson decision, however,
should be considered in light of other cases that have held, when prejudg-
ment interest is permitted by law, that a petition containing a general prayer
for relief is sufficient. 82
Rule 101 provides that a defendant's written answer is to be filed on the
Monday next after the expiration of twenty days from the date of service. 83
In Proctor v. Green84 the twentieth day for the answer fell on the Sunday
before the fourth of July. Rejecting defendant's contention that an answer
was not required until July eleventh, the court concluded that the answer
was originally due on Monday, the fourth of July, but was extended to only
July fifth as a result of the legal holiday.85
VI. LIMITATIONS
The limitations provisions included in the Texas health care statutes con-
tinued to receive intense judicial scrutiny during the survey period. Last
term in Borderlon v. Peck86 the supreme court ruled that fraudulent conceal-
ment would toll the limitations period specified in article 4590i.87 This term
the supreme court initially ruled in Nelson v. Krusen88 that the discovery
rule 89 was inapplicable in a case governed by article 5.82 of the Texas Insur-
78. Id. 92.
79. 666 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
80. Id. at 267.
81. Id. at 268.
82. See Sanchez v. Matthews, 636 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (abuse of discretion to deny filing of amendment specially pleading for prejudg-
ment interest); Arndt v. National Supply Co., 633 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (simple prayer for interest provides fair notice of claim for
relief for prejudgment interest).
83. TEX. R. Civ. P. 101.
84. 673 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
85. Id. at 392-93.
86. 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983), discussed in 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 438.
87. 661 S.W.2d at 909. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.
1985) generally provides a two-year limitation period for filing malpractice suits against physi-
cians or hospitals carrying liability insurance.
88. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 82 (Nov. 19, 1983) (opinion withdrawn).
89. The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations will not start running until
the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to his claimed damage or until the date discov-
ery should reasonably have been made. See, e.g., Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.
1972); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1967). See generally 1983 Annual Sur-
vey, supra note 73, at 300-01.
In Mann v. A. H. Robins Co., 741 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984), one of the Dalkon shield cases
that was also decided during the survey period, the Fifth Circuit held that the discovery rule
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ance Code-the precedessor to article 4590i.90 Acording to the court, the
legislature made no allowance for the judicially created discovery rule in
enacting article 5.82.91 The court distinguished its holding in Borderlon by
stating that fraudulent concealment "is an affirmative defense predicated
upon an intentional wrong perpetrated by the defendant, whereas the 'dis-
covery rule' is a test used to determine when a plaintiff's cause of action
accrues based upon statutory construction and the knowledge available to
the plaintiff."'92
On rehearing, the supreme court confirmed its original view that article
5.82 abolished the discovery rule in actions against health care providers
who carry liability insurance. 93 For that very reason, however, the court
held that the statute violated the open courts provision of the Texas Consti-
tution. 94 In Krusen the plaintiffs had sued a doctor and his hospital, alleging
that the doctor negligently advised a pregnant woman that she was not a
genetic carrier of muscular dystrophy and was no more likely than any other
woman to have a child afflicted by the disease. The plaintiffs alleged that
they would have terminated the pregnancy had they known of the risk that
their child would be born with the disease. The child's disease went unno-
ticed, and indeed could not have been discovered, until he had difficulty in
walking at age three. The supreme court held that because suit could not be
brought until after expiration of the limitations period, and the discovery
rule was inapplicable, article 5.82 required the plaintiffs to do the impossi-
ble-to sue before they had any reason to know they should sue. 9 5 Charac-
terizing that result as shocking, absurd, and unjust, the court held that the
limitations provision was unconstitutional to the extent it purported to cut
off an injured person's right to sue before the person had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to discover the wrong and bring suit.9
6
Having declared the limitations statute unconstitutional as applied to the
parents' cause of action, the court attempted to reconcile the case with its
earlier decision in Sax v. Votteler.97 Acording to the court, the adult liti-
gants in Sax discovered their injuries while they still had a reasonable time
tolled the applicable statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovered the cause of her injury.
Id. at 81-82; accord Timberlake v. A. H. Robins Co., 727 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1984).
90. Article 4590i, § 10.01 essentially recodified former art. 5.82, § 4 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
with Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865, repealed by Act of June
16, 1977, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064.
91. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 83.
92. Id. at 84.
93. 678 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1984).
94. Id. at 923; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
95. 678 S.W.2d at 923.
96. Id.
97. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983), discussed in 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 435-36.
In Sax the court held that TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4, repealed by Act of June 16,
1977, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064, did not run afoul of the open courts
provision as applied to the claims in favor of the minor's parents. 648 S.W.2d at 667. The
statute was declared unconstitutional, however, to the extent it barred assertion of the minor's
cause of action once he reached the age of majority, if more than two years had expired since
the date of injury, even though the minor had no right to bring his suit beforehand. Id.
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to sue since they had over one year from the date of discovery to file suit
even if the two-year limitations period was not tolled. 98 Thus, unlike the
parents in Krusen, the plaintiffs in Sax at least had an opportunity to file
their claims before the limitations period expired, even without the tolling
aid of the abrogated discovery rule.
Although article 5.82 of the insurance code was repealed in 1977,99 the
significance of the Krusen decision will not be as shortlived. Courts have
already implied that the statute's interpretation applies equally to its succes-
sor, article 4590i, section 10.01,100 which is virtually identical to the repealed
limitations statute.°10 Indeed, in Phillips v. Sharpstown General Hospital'0 2
the court relied on Krusen in holding that the discovery rule was also inap-
plicable to the limitations statute contained in article 4590i. 103 The court's
decision was announced before the rehearing in Krusen, however, and the
court concluded without argument that the "constitutional rights of these
adult appellants were not impaired."' 1 4 This holding nevertheless accords
with the supreme court's subsequent analysis in Krusen since the plaintiffs,
like the parents in Sax, discovered their injury more than a year before the
expiration of the two-year limitations period.10 5 The court in Phillips also
decided that the notice provision contained in article 4590i 10 6 suspends the
running of the statute of limitations.' 0 7 Consequently, notice of the health
care claim given within sixty days of the expiration of the two-year limita-
tions period suspends the limitations period for seventy-five days, following
which the remaining period of the original two-year limitations continues to
run. 108
Valdez v. Texas Children's Hospital'09 considered the tolling effect of an-
other statute on the limitations period prescribed by article 4590i. There the
court held that the two-year limitations period was suspended for twelve
months pursuant to article 55381" because of the minor plaintiff's death."'I
The court disagreed with the defendant's contention that article 4590i, sec-
98. 678 S.W.2d at 923.
99. See supra note 90.
100. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
101. See, e.g., Phillips v. Sharpstown Gen. Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (discovery rule inapplicable to case governed by art. 4590i,
§ 10.01); Littlefield v. Hays, 609 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ)
(two-year statute of limitations on tort claims against insured doctors is constitutional).
102. 664 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
103. Id. at 167.
104. Id. at 169.
105. The court also held that the plaintiff's constitutional attacks on the statute were not
properly preserved for review on appeal because plaintiffs did not include these arguments in
their summary judgment response. Id.; see City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589
S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979); TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
106. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985) states that the
provision requiring 60 days' notice before suit can be brought, id. § 4.01(a), tolls the limita-
tions period for a period of 75 days following such notice.
107. 664 S.W.2d at 165.
108. Id. The court rejected appellee's alternative position that the limitations period was
simply extended to the date following 75 days from the delivery of the notice. Id.
109. 673 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
110. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5538 (Vernon 1958) provides:
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tion 10.01 established an absolute two-year bar for the filing of health care
liability claims, and chose instead to harmonize the two statutes. 1 2 Finally,
in Morrison v. Chan1 3 the court held that the limitations period under arti-
cle 4590i begins to run from either the date the health treatment complained
of was completed or the date of the act or omission on which the claim is
founded. 114 The court rejected appellant's interpretation of the applicable
language, which would have permitted filing of a claim two years from the
date of the injury in cases where the damages were suffered at some point
after the commission of the negligent act."
5
In addition to cases involving medical malpractice, the courts handed
down several decisions concerning limitations in other areas of professional
malpractice. In Brown v. M. W Kellogg Co.,116 for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit construed article 5536a, the statute of limitations governing malpractice
claims against engineers and architects for defective design and construction
of improvements." 17 First, the court found that the statute was not tolled
until the plaintiff's injury was manifested, since the running of the statute
commenced upon substantial completion of the improvements. 1 8 Stressing
the remedial nature of the statute, the court also rejected the plaintiff's sec-
ond contention that the sale of technology or concepts does not constitute
the "design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property"
contemplated by the statute." 9 In addition, the court dispensed with the
plaintiff's constitutional attacks on the statute, finding that all but one of
them had been rejected previously either by Texas courts or the Fifth Cir-
cuit.' 2 0 Finally, the court held that the scope of the statute was not limited
In case of the death of any person against whom or in whose favor there may
be a cause of action, the law of limitation shall cease to run against such cause of
action until twelve months after such death, unless an administrator or executor
shall have sooner qualified according to law upon such deceased person's estate;
in which case the law of limitation shall only cease to run until such
qualification.
111. 673 S.W.2d at 345.
112. Id. at 344; see Hart v. Winsett, 171 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1943) (duty to harmonize
statutes if reasonably possible to do so).
113. 668 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. Id. at 485.
115. Id.
116. 743 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1984).
117. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides a ten-year pe-
riod of limitations for filing suits against architects and engineers alleging injury arising out of
defective improvements. The period commences to run after the substantial completion of the
improvements. Id.
118. 743 F.2d at 268.
119. Id. The court observed that plaintiffs' proffered interpretation would render the stat-
ute meaningless because "it is the ideas and concepts of engineers and the technology incorpo-
rating them, which, upon embodiment in construction, make their services valuable." Id.
120. See, e.g., Hasty v. Rust Eng'g Co., 726 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
claim that statute violated due process and equal protection clauses of state and federal consti-
tutions, and TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (rejecting claim that statute violates
open courts provision of the Texas constitution), appeal dismissed for want of substantial fed-
eral question, 459 U.S. 802 (1982). The court in Brown also held that the statute was not
forbidden special legislation since it extended evenhandedly to all architects and engineers,
residents and nonresidents alike. 743 F.2d at 269; see TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56.
[Vol. 39
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
to individuals, and that corporations, if they otherwise qualified, enjoyed the
statute's benefit. 121 According to Hixson v. Salem Corp.,122 however, a cor-
poration must prove, rather than simply allege, that it is an "engineer" in
order to raise a limitations defense under the statute. 123 In Armstrong v.
Ablon 124 the court held that dismissal of the plaintiffs' first suit under rule
170,125 as a sanction for failure to comply with the court's discovery order,
was equivalent to a dismissal for want of prosecution. 126 Accordingly, the
statute of limitations was not tolled by the pendency of the plaintiff's earlier
lawsuit. 127
VII. PARTIES
The sweeping amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure effected
minor modifications to several of the rules relating to parties. The most sig-
nificant of these changes affected rule 38,128 which governs third-party prac-
tice. A defending party need no longer obtain leave of court before filing a
third-party claim if the claim is filed within thirty days after service of his
original answer. 129 If the election to file such a claim is made later, however,
the third-party plaintiff is still required to seek leave of court, with notice to
all parties, before bringing the claim. 130 The amendment to rule 38 also
deleted the language providing that a third-party defendant is bound with
respect to the adjudication of liability between the plaintiff and the third-
party plaintiff.' 3 ' That modification, however, is probably not intended to
change the existing law on the subject.
As pointed out in earlier surveys, 132 since 1977 shareholder-plaintiffs
bringing derivative suits have not been required to satisfy the prerequisites of
rule 42.133 They were obliged instead to comply with article 5.14(B) of the
Texas Business Corporation Act.134 The 1984 amendment to the rule, how-
ever, inserted a new provision specifically addressing derivative suits. 135 It
provides that a plaintiff in a derivative suit must allege that he was a record
or beneficial owner of shares at the time of the transaction complained
about, or that the shares devolved upon him by operation of law from a
121. 743 F.2d at 268.
122. 673 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. Finding that a genuine issue of fact existed on this point, the court reversed a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the corporation. Id. at 346.
124. No. 05-83-00600-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas June 20, 1984, no writ) (not yet reported).
125. Tex. R. Civ. P. 170 (Vernon 1976) (now codified at TEX. R. Civ. P. 215).
126. No. 05-83-00600-CV, slip op. at 3.
127. Id.




132. See, e.g., 1983 Annual Survey, supra note 73, at 307; 1981 Annual Survey, supra note
46, at 375.
133. Tex. R. Civ. P. 42 (Vernon 1977). Prior to the 1977 amendments, rule 42 applied to
derivative suits. Id.; see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw.
L.J. 265, 272 (1975).
134. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.14(B) (Vernon 1980).
135. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
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person who was an owner at that time. 136 Further, the plaintiff must allege
with particularity the efforts he made to have the board of directors bring
the suit, or the reasons why no such efforts were made. 137 Finally, the plain-
tiff must fairly and adequately represent the interests of other similarly situ-
ated shareholders, and the suit cannot be dismissed or settled without proper
notice to those shareholders and court approval. 138
Rule 161,139 which allows a plaintiff suing multiple defendants to dismiss
the suit as to unserved defendants, was also amended during the survey pe-
riod. Under the amended rule a plaintiff may not dismiss his suit against a
principal obligor without also dismissing the parties secondarily liable, ex-
cept in cases covered by article 2088. 40 Changes made with respect to other
rules concerning parties were purely cosmetic.
4 1
Although rule 39142 now contemplates that indispensable parties are
rather rare,' 43 courts generally apply a strict standard in cases involving
ownership of real property. 44 Thus, in Partin v. Holden'4 5 the court re-
versed a decree of partition, even as to the six answering defendants, because
all of the owners of undivided interests in the land were not served with
process in the suit.146 Noting that recent changes had liberalized the rules
governing party joinder,' 47 the court nevertheless held that the matter of
absent parties was jurisdictional in partition suits owing to the express re-
quirements of rule 757.148 Accordingly, the court held that the judgment
136. Id. A person owning an interest in a voting trust for shares at the specified time may
also bring the derivative suit. Id.
137. Id. The additional pleading requirements imposed on plaintiffs under the new rule do
not effect a change in the existing substantive law. Under art. 5.14(B), the plaintiff was already
required to plead his shareholder demand on the directors, and he had no standing to bring the
suit unless he met the same stock ownership requirements now contained in rule 42. See TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(B) (Vernon 1980).
138. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
139. Id. 161.
140. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2088 (Vernon 1964) provides that a judgment
may not be entered against an endorser, surety, or guarantor, when the suit has been discontin-
ued against the primary obligor, unless the primary obligor is outside the reach of process,
dead, or notoriously insolvent. In Ferguson v. McCarrell, 582 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1979), the court held that a
judgment rendered in a suit which proceeded solely against the guarantors of a note did not
violate article 2088 where the written guaranty contracts imposed the status of primary obli-
gors upon the guarantors. See generally 1981 Annual Survey, supra note 46, at 374-75.
141. For example, TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(f) was rewritten to eliminate language that simply
repeated provisions contained elsewhere in the rules. The rules regarding death of a party
were also updated slightly by substituting the word "dismissed" in place of the outmoded term
"discontinued." Id. 151, 153.
142. Id. 39.
143. See Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam), discussed in 1983
Annual Survey, supra note 73, at 306; Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204
(Tex. 1974).
144. See, e.g., Neely v. Schooler, 643 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (party to whom defendant had deeded land was indispensable in suit for specific
performance of contract of sale).
145. 663 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
146. Id. at 886-87.
147. Id. at 885.
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 757 provides: "Upon the filing of petition for partition, the clerk shall
issue citation for each of the joint owners, or joint claimants, named therein, as in other cases,
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was not sustainable on appeal, even though the defendants registered their
nonjoinder complaint for the first time on appeal.' 49 The court also con-
cluded that the plaintiff's citation by publication on the absent defendants
was insufficient since the trial court failed to appoint an attorney to represent
the absent owners served by publication, as required by rule 759.150
Rule 42(b)(4) provides in part that a case may be certified as a class action
if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers."' 151 Finding that questions about a class plaintiff's alleged injuries
caused by contamination from a nearby lead smelter were not questions
common to the class, the court in RSR Corp. v. Hayes 52 held that the trial
court had abused its discretion in certifying the purported class.' 53 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that the amount of lead on each class member's land
varied greatly, and that seventy percent of the class members within a signifi-
cant area did not have hazardous levels of lead on their land. Therefore, the
question of whether the lead contamination level was hazardous was not a
question common to the class. 154 Likewise, since liability under a theory of
negligence requires a showing of injury, and the undisputed facts demon-
strated in many cases an absence of injury, the court concluded that the
question of liability also was not common to the class. 55
VIII. DISCOVERY
No area of civil process underwent more change during the past year than
that of discovery. The new amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which became effective April 1, 1984, literally revolutionized discovery
practice in Texas. The following discussion will focus on the more impor-
tant rule modifications and recent judicial decisions that appear to have con-
tinuing applicability.
The Scope of Discovery. Consolidating a number of prior provisions, new
rule 166b156 now defines the scope of discovery available under the various
discovery procedures. In general, parties may obtain discovery regarding
"any matter which is relevant to the subject matter in the pending ac-
tion."'157 Further, proposed discovery is not objectionable on the ground
that "the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the informa-
tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
and such citations shall be served in the manner and for the time provided for the service of
citation in other cases."
149. 663 S.W.2d at 885.
150. Id. at 886; TEX. R. Civ. P. 759.
151. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4).
152. 673 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ dism'd).
153. Id. at 933.
154. Id.
155. Id.





In Jampole v. Touchy159 the supreme court addressed issues concerning
the scope of discovery in a products liability action. Claiming that his wife
had died in an automobile accident because of a defectively designed fuel
tank, the plaintiff sought to obtain information from the defendant regarding
alternative fuel tank designs. The trial court limited discovery to alternative
design information about other automobiles that were substantially similar
to the automobile involved in the accident. The supreme court, however,
held that the trial court took an unduly restrictive view of the degree of
similarity necessary for the design information on other vehicles to be rele-
vant. 16° In this connection, the court stated that the alternative information
would be discoverable even if the other automobiles were not identical.1 61
The plaintiff also complained about the trial court's denial of discovery
concerning assembly diagrams and instructions for his wife's car. Based on
an objection that the requested documents were competitively sensitive and
had proprietary value, the trial court ruled that the defendant was not re-
quired to produce any of the assembly documentation. The supreme court
disagreed with that conclusion and held that the discovery could not be de-
nied, "because of an asserted proprietary interest . . . when a protective or-
der would sufficiently preserve that interest."1 62
The Jampole case is also significant because it revealed the supreme
court's continuing willingness to issue writs of mandamus in discovery pro-
ceedings. The court previously had granted mandamus relief in connection
with rulings that either granted or denied discovery, provided a clear abuse
of discretion was shown. 163 The supreme court had not, however, specifi-
cally addressed the question of whether a writ of mandamus should be issued
in the discovery context, given the existence of a remedy by appeal after
trial. Addressing this issue directly in Jampole, the supreme court decided
that an appellate remedy was not adequate and that, therefore, a writ of
mandamus was appropriate. The supreme court specifically noted that the
appellate remedy was inadequate because on appeal the plaintiff would not
be able to show the substance of the information that was discoverable and
thus could not establish that a denial of discovery was harmful. 164 Accord-
ing to the court, the appeal remedy was not as effective as mandamus since a
party should not have to try his lawsuit without important discovery, "only
158. Id.
159. 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984).
160. Id. at 573.
161. Id. at 573-74.
162. Id. at 574-75.
163. E.g., West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1978) (attorney cannot be compelled
to disclose matters within attorney-client privilege unless client waives privilege); Allen v.
Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1977) (abuse of discretion to deny requested discovery
with respect to relevant and material items unavailable from other sources); Barker v. Dun-
ham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. 1977) (discovery of reports, factual observations, and opinions of
nontestifying expert should be permitted); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 191, 328 S.W.2d 434,
440 (1959) (income tax return subject to discovery provided that relevancy and materiality to
the issues are shown).
164. 673 S.W.2d at 576.
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to have that lawsuit rendered a certain nullity on appeal."' 65
Experts and Potential Fact Witnesses. Rule 166b 166 clarifies certain aspects
related to the discovery of information about experts and potential fact wit-
nesses. Under the rule a party may obtain discovery of the identity and
location of any potential party and of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts.167 The rule specifies that a person has knowledge of relevant facts
"when he or she has or may have knowledge of any discoverable matter.' 68
Practitioners should be aware that the rule does not authorize discovery of
the identity of witnesses, but only persons having knowledge of relevant
facts. 16
9
Rule 166b also sets forth a comprehensive procedure regarding the discov-
ery of the identity of experts and related information. 170 In essence, the rule
establishes three categories of experts: (1) testifying experts; (2) consulting
experts; and (3) consulting experts whose work product is used, in whole or
in part, as a basis for a testifying expert's opinion. As under the prior rules,
a party may obtain discovery of the identity and location of an expert who
may be called as a witness, including the subject matter on which the expert
is expected to testify, his mental impressions and opinions, and the factual
basis for such mental impressions and opinions. 71 The same information
may also be obtained concerning a nontestifying expert if the expert's work
product forms a basis, in whole or in part, for the opinions of an expert who
may be called as a witness. 72 Otherwise, information related to a consultant
expert is not discoverable.
The new rule 166b(e)(3) specifically provides that the trial judge may now
compel a party to make the "determination and disclosure of whether an
expert may be called to testify within a reasonable and specific time before
the date of trial."' 173 The trial judge may also require the reduction of an
expert's report to tangible form within a reasonable time before the date of
trial. 174 The trial court is entitled to exclude testimony of any expert witness
or person having knowledge of a discoverable matter when information con-
cerning the witness was not disclosed as required by rule 166b, "unless the
trial court finds that good cause sufficient to require admission exists.' 1 75
Although decided prior to the enactment of rule 166b, two recent cases
may still be relevant to issues concerning discovery of expert information.
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Schattman,176 an action related to defec-
165. Id.










176. 667 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
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tive tubing, the defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly re-
quired his employee to testify about an analysis of the tubing. The plaintiff
had sought in this connection an order compelling the defendant's employee
to testify about the analysis, which he refused to do during his deposition.
At a hearing concerning the reconsideration of an order compelling discov-
ery, the defendant indicated, for the first time, that the employee would act
as a consultant. In light of this positive designation of the employee's status
as a consultant, the court of appeals held that the lower court abused its
discretion in ordering further discovery of the employee's analysis.' 77 Fur-
ther, the appellate court noted that even a full-time employee may be desig-
nated as a consultant, which makes his expert opinion immune from
discovery. 178 In comparison, the court in Crowe v. Smith 179 found that an
expert was not used solely for consultation and was therefore subject to dis-
covery. 180 In this negligence action the plaintiff had been treated by a doctor
whose report was favorable to the defendant's case. In light of the plaintiff's
failure to establish that the doctor had directly aided the plaintiff's attorney
in the investigation and preparation of the case, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the doctor-expert's report was discoverable.18 ' Further, the ap-
pellate court noted that an expert is not necessarily a consultant merely
because he will not be called as a witness.' 8 2
Insurance and Settlement Agreements. Under rule 166b(O(1) a party may
obtain discovery regarding insurance agreements, although an application
for insurance is not to be treated as part of the agreement. 8 3 The rule al-
lows the discovery of the existence and contents of any settlement agree-
ment. 184 The rule clearly specifies, however, that information concerning
insurance and settlement agreements is not, by reason of disclosure, admissi-
ble in evidence at trial.18 5
In addition to the rule change, the court in Aztec Life Insurance Co. v.
Dellana 86 considered the question of whether a plaintiff in an insurance case
should be allowed to discover the defendant's insurance claims denial jour-
nal and claims files. Contending that the defendant insurance company had
breached a credit life and disability insurance policy, the plaintiff also as-
serted that, in denying his claim, the insurance company had violated article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, 187 which, in general, prohibits unfair
and deceptive practices in the insurance business. Seeking to develop his
claim, the plaintiff served a request for production of documents upon the
177. Id. at 356; see Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tex. 1977).
178. 667 S.W.2d at 356.
179. 679 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
180. Id. at 23.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(f(l).
184. Id.
185. Id. 166b(0(2).
186. 667 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
187. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
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defendant insurance company to obtain a claims denial journal and all files
that related to claims that had been denied under the same exclusion under
which plaintiff's claim had been denied. The appellate court concluded that
the defendant should be required to produce the requested documents be-
cause they were relevant to the assertion that the defendant had engaged in a
course of dealing that was unfair and deceptive. 188 The court also held that
any concern about disclosure of private information in the claims files could
be resolved by an in-camera inspection of the files by the trial court and the
issuance of a protective order, if needed. 189
Exemptions from Discovery. As a result of the recent rule amendments, the
exemptions from discovery have now been comprehensively listed in a single
provision in rule 166b. 190 In general, the exempted matters include: (1) an
attorney's work product; (2) written statements of potential witnesses and
parties; (3) the identity, mental impressions, and opinions of nontestifying
experts; (4) communications passing between the parties' agents, representa-
tives, or employees that are made subsequent to the occurrence or transac-
tion upon which the suit is based and in connection with the prosecution,
investigation, and defense of the occurrence or transaction; and (5) privi-
leged matters. Unlike former rule 186a, 191 the new rule protects only com-
munications between a party's employees, agents, and representatives who
are investigating a claim and does not exempt information obtained in the
course of an investigation of a claim or defense by those persons.
Addressing the question of whether a party's statements to his insurance
carrier are privileged, the court in Menton v. Lattimore192 held that those
statements are immune from discovery. In this malpractice case, the defend-
ant-doctor was interviewed by a claims agent for his insurance company.
The interview was tape-recorded and eventually the trial court ordered a
transcript of the tape recording produced to the plaintiffs, notwithstanding a
claim of privilege. As a general rule, statements made by a party to his
insurance representative in the course of an investigation are privileged.1 93
The plaintiffs, however, argued on appeal that an exception should apply
because the statements were made in the furtherance of a fraudulent scheme
by the doctor to conceal the true facts concerning the incident in question.
Recognizing that the question was one of first impression, the court of ap-
peals refused to create an exception for an "illegal, perjured or dishonest
defense" or the "planning or perpetration of a crime or fraud." 194 The ap-
pellate court thus regarded the tape transcript as privileged.
In an action involving an automobile accident that resulted in the death of
188. 667 S.W.2d at 915.
189. Id. at 916.
190. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3).
191. Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976).
192. 667 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
193. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(b), (c); Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976).
194. 667 S.W.2d at 341.
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a police officer, the court in W W Rodgers & Sons Produce Co. v. Johnson195
held that witness statements were not discoverable. The wife of the police
officer and the city of Dallas brought an action against the company whose
truck had been involved in the accident. The defendant sought to compel
the city to produce certain witness statements taken by police officers from
witnesses to the accident. Finding that the purpose of the proposed discov-
ery was for impeachment, the appellate court ruled that the witness state-
ments were not discoverable. 196 In this connection, the court relied heavily
on a prior supreme court decision that held that witness statements can not
have impeachment value prior to trial. 197
Supplementation of Discovery. One of the most important revisions to the
new discovery rules is the general requirement that a party must supplement
discovery not less than thirty days prior to the beginning of trial, unless the
court finds that good cause exists for permitting or requiring later supple-
mentation. 19 8 A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement discovery if
he obtains information on the basis of which he knows that the original re-
sponse was incorrect or incomplete when made or he knows that the re-
sponse, though correct and complete when made, is no longer true and
complete and the circumstances are such that failure to amend an answer is
in substance misleading.199 A party is also obligated to supplement informa-
tion concerning the identity of expert witnesses and the substance of their
testimony "as soon as is practical, but in no event less than thirty . . . days
prior to the beginning of trial except on leave of court. ' '2° ° In addition to the
rule, a duty to supplement discovery may be imposed by order of the trial
court, agreement of the parties, or through a new request for supplementa-
tion of prior answers.20 1 As a sanction for failure to supplement discovery,
rule 215 specifies that the party who fails to supplement shall not be entitled
to present the supplemental evidence unless the trial court finds that "good
cause sufficient to require admission exists."
20 2
Requests for Admissions and Interrogatories. Significantly, the new rule
166b(2)(a) modifies prior practice regarding interrogatories and requests for
admission by providing that such forms of discovery are no longer objection-
able because they seek an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact.20 3 With respect to interrogatories, the trial court
may, in its discretion, order that an interrogatory not be answered concern-
195. 673 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
196. Id. at 295.
197. Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. 1970).





203. Id. 166b(2)(a). Formerly, the courts had held that opinions and contentions were not
the proper subject of interrogatories and requests for admissions. See, e.g., Boyter v. MCR
Constr. Co., 673 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ re'f n.r.e.); Henke Grain Co.
v. Keenan, 658 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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ing an opinion or contention until discovery has been completed, the date of
a pretrial conference, or at a later time.20 4
Rule 169 provides that responses to requests for admissions shall be made
within thirty days after the service of the request rather than, as under for-
mer practice, ten days after service. 20 5 Further, responses to requests for
admissions may be made by a written answer or objection signed by the
party or his attorney, rather than a sworn statement signed by the party as
was required under the old rule.20 6 With respect to sanctions for failure to
comply with the admission procedure, rule 215 specifies that a request shall
be deemed admitted unless a timely response or objection is served.20 7 An
evasive or incomplete answer may be treated as a failure to answer.20 8
Under the new rules it is thus not necessary to move to have requests
deemed admitted if a party fails to respond.
If an answer or objection has been served, the requesting party may move
to determine the sufficiency of the response or objection. 20 9 Unless an objec-
tion is found to be justified, an answer must be served. If an answer does not
comply with rule 169,210 the trial court may order either that the matter is
admitted or that an amended answer be served. 211
Finally, if a party fails to admit a request, the requesting party may re-
cover reasonable expenses incurred in proving the truth of the matter. 21 2
The trial court is required to award such expenses unless: (1) the request
was objectionable; (2) the admission sought was of no substantial impor-
tance; (3) the responding party had reasonable ground to believe he might
prevail on the matter; or (4) there was other good reason for failure to
admit.2 13
Depositions. A number of the amendments to the rules affect deposition pro-
cedure. Under rule 200, a notice of deposition may now be given upon rea-
sonable notice and the mandatory ten-day time limit no longer need be
observed. 2 14 In addition, a new rule has been added that authorizes the use
of depositions by telephone. 21 5 Finally, a comprehensive scheme for taking
depositions in foreign jurisdictions has also been enacted. 216
The rules now clarify the practice regarding objections made at the taking
of the deposition. In the case of objections to the form of a question or the
nonresponsiveness of an answer, those types of objection are waived if not
204. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a).
205. Id. 169.
206. Id.
207. Id. 215(4)(a). A response or objection is considered timely if made within thirty days












made at the time of the taking of the oral deposition. 21 7 Other types of
objections, however, are not waived and may be made at the time of trial.218
Finally, the amendments also make significant changes to the practice re-
garding return of depositions. If a witness does not sign and return a deposi-
tion within twenty days after its submission to him or his counsel, the officer
taking the deposition shall sign it and the deposition may be used fully as
though signed, unless the court finds that the reasons for refusal to sign are
justified. 219
Apart from the rule amendments, two cases discussed issues regarding
depositions. Having been ordered to produce seven overseas employees for
depositions in Houston, the defendant in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Solito2 20
sought a writ of mandamus to overturn that order by the trial court. With
respect to this issue the court of appeals noted that, in cases involving inter-
national parties and witnesses, the trial court must be "especially sensitive to
the (1) actual need for the requested depositions and (2) alternative means of
taking the depositions. '22 1 In view of probable alternative sources of infor-
mation and the lack of relevant information contained in depositions of simi-
lar witnesses taken previously in the case, the court of appeals held that the
trial court abused its discretion by requiring the overseas witnesses to appear
in Houston.2 2 2 The central issue in De Forest v. Dear223 was whether the
deposition of an absent defendant could be excluded from evidence simply
because it had not been on file one day prior to trial. Although the deposi-
tion in the case had been filed after the trial began, the court of appeals
concluded that the deposition should not be excluded for that reason.
224
Production of Documents. As obtained under prior practice, a party may
secure production of documents and other tangible matters that are within a
person's possession, custody, or control.225 Significantly, the new discovery
rules define "possession, custody, or control" as including a situation where
a person has a "superior right to compel the production from a third party
(including an agency, authority or representative). ' 226 In addition, rule 167
states that responses to requests for documents must be served within thirty
days after service, and not from the date of the receipt of the request.
2 2 7




220. 668 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
221. Id. at 895.
222. Id. at 895-96; see also Hyam v. American Export Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir.
1954) (actual need for oral examination at the forum must be weighed against the burden to
the opposing party).
223. 659 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Id. at 91. Contra Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).





items requested with reasonable particularity. 228
Orders Compelling Discovery and Sanctions. Under new rule 215229 all pro-
visions regarding sanctions are now set forth in a single, comprehensive rule.
With respect to motions for orders compelling discovery, the rule specifies
that an application for such an order may be made to the trial court in which
the action is pending or, on matters relating to depositions, to the trial court
in the district where the deposition is being taken. 230 An application for an
order directed to a nonparty deponent must be made to a court in the district
where the deposition is being taken. 23 1
The most important amendment to the new rule is the specific provision
regarding sanctions for a party's failure to supplement discovery as required
by rule 166b. 232 The rule also provides that if a party fails to respond to
discovery, such as interrogatories, requests for admissions, or depositions,
the opposing party may move for an order compelling discovery or seek
sanctions without the necessity for first having obtained a court order com-
pelling such discovery. 233 An evasive or incomplete answer to a discovery
request is treated as a failure to answer. 234 In addition to the sanctions for
failing to comply with a discovery request or an order compelling discovery,
a party is also subject to sanctions under rule 215 on two grounds. The first
ground is that he is found to be abusing the discovery process in seeking,
making, or resisting discovery, the second is that the court finds an interro-
gatory or request for inspection or production to be unreasonably frivolous,
oppressive, or harassing, or a response or answer to be unreasonably frivo-
lous or made for purposes of delay.235
The types of sanctions that may be imposed against parties are similar to
those that were available under prior practice. Importantly, the trial court
may make orders regarding sanctions as are just,236 and the list of sanctions





231. Id. Presumably, a motion for protective order filed by a nonparty deponent with re-
spect to his proposed deposition, being a mirror image of a motion to compel discovery, may
be presented to the court in the district where the deposition is proposed to be taken. See In re
Subpoena Addressed to InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A., No. 84-7251-M (Dist. Ct. Dallas
County, 298th Judicial District of Texas, June 4, 1984) (order granting motion to quash sub-
poena or for protective order).
232. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b. For a discussion of the sanctions for failure to supplement, see
supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.




237. Examples of the types of available sanctions include:
(1) An order disallowing any further discovery of any kind or of a particular
kind by the disobedient party;
(2) An order charging all or any portion of the expenses of discovery or
taxable court costs or both against the disobedient party or the attorney advising
him;
(3) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
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Although decided prior to the recent amendments to the discovery rules,
Brantley v. Etter238 is pertinent to the subject of sanctions. In that case the
appellant failed to appear for her deposition. The trial court entered an or-
der striking her pleadings, granting an interlocutory default judgment, and
ordering her specifically to perform a contract that was in controversy.
Prior to an evidentiary hearing on the remaining issue of the amount of at-
torney's fees, the appellant requested a jury, but the trial court proceeded to
try the issue without a jury. Although concluding that the appellant was not
entitled to a jury trial at the hearing on a motion for sanctions, the court of
appeals did find error in the denial of a jury trial at the final hearing on
attorney's fees. 239 In this connection, the court stated that the entry of a
default judgment, as a sanction for failure to permit discovery, "does not
dispense with the necessity of a jury trial, if one has been demanded, on an
unliquidated claim. ' 240
Protective Orders. Rule 166b now gives trial courts the authority to enter
any order in the interest of justice necessary to protect any person from dis-
covery that constitutes an "undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment
or annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights. '241
Significantly, trial courts are not limited to any particular types of protective
orders. Their authority includes, but is not limited to:
a. ordering that requested discovery not be sought in whole or in
part, or that the extent or subject matter of discovery be limited, or that
it not be undertaken at the time or place specified.
b. ordering that the discovery be undertaken only by such method
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(4) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(5) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing with or without prejudice the
action or proceedings or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(6) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(7) When a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 167a(a)
requiring him to appear or produce another for examination, such orders as are
listed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this subdivision, unless the person
failing to comply shows that he is unable to appear or to produce such person
for examination;
(8) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him, or
both, to pay, at such time as ordered by the court, the reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
Id.
238. 662 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
239. Id. at 756.
240. Id.
241. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
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or upon such terms and conditions or at the time and place directed by
the court.
c. ordering that results of discovery be sealed or otherwise ade-
quately protected; that its distribution be limited; or that its disclosure
be restricted. 242
In connection with litigation over the construction and engineering of a
south Texas nuclear project, Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Hardy24 3
discussed a trial court's power to permit public dissemination of pretrial dis-
covery material. Based on the potential impact of the disclosure of discovery
information to the litigants' right to a fair trial, the trial court entered an
order that required the parties, their attorneys, and assistants to refrain from
disclosing to third parties information obtained through the discovery pro-
cess and placed under seal the depositions, interrogatory answers, and other
documents that were obtained in discovery. In addition, the order specifi-
cally provided that it placed no limitation on: access by third parties to
hearings or evidence that might be offered therein; the media's right to pub-
lish information that was obtained or might be obtained from other sources;
and the attorneys' right to communicate with their clients. Finally, the trial
court offered in its order to entertain reasonable requests to modify its terms
in the future.
Dissatisfied with this order, the newspaper and two cities sought writs of
mandamus from the court of appeals to have the order set aside. With re-
spect to the newspaper's contentions, the court of appeals noted that the
question of whether the press has a right of access to trials was not
presented. The issue was whether the media representatives had a "right to
root through a tremendous pile of undigested documentary evidence assem-
bled during pretrial discovery proceedings. ' '244 Finding that the trial court
had acted in an effort to ensure a fair trial, the appellate court concluded
that the order did not constitute an impermissible prior restraint upon the
rights of any of the parties.245
With respect to the cities' contentions, the court of appeals held that the
order did not interfere with their ability to prepare for trial nor did the order
impermissibly interfere with any alleged right of the cities to communicate
about the lawsuit with their citizens. 246 The court of appeals instead deter-
mined that the order did not prohibit any attorney from communicating
with his clients or prospective witnesses concerning discovery material. The
order rather was intended to seal the lips of prospective witnesses and parties
to prevent them from discussing such material with third parties outside the
case. 247 In sum, the court of appeals found no error had been committed by
the trial judge in entering the protective order.
242. Id. 166b(4)(a), (b), (c).
243. 678 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
244. Id. at 499.
245. Id. at 500.
246. Id. at 508.
247. Id. at 505.
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Miscellaneous. For the practitioner who is tempted to sign an affidavit in
support of his client's case, Hilliard v. Heard248 is a warning that the attor-
ney may become a deponent as a result. In this case the defendant's attorney
filed a controverting affidavit to certain affidavits filed by the plaintiffs con-
cerning the reasonableness and necessity of goods sold to them. 249 The
plaintiffs then sought to take the deposition of the defendant's attorney, but
the trial court refused to allow the deposition to proceed. In a subsequent
mandamus proceeding, the court of appeals determined that the trial court
had clearly abused its discretion because, due to the filing of the contro-
verting affidavit, the attorney had injected himself into the lawsuit and sub-
jected himself to deposition as a witness.250
IX. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Since 1981, rule 18a has governed the procedure for seeking disqualifica-
tion of a district judge. 25' No companion procedures existed, however, for
disqualifying other judges, such as judges of the county or justice courts, or a
justice of an appellate court.252 Recently enacted changes to the rules of
civil procedure have eliminated these gaps. Rule 18a, as amended effective
April 1, 1984, applies to all courts other than a court of appeals or the Texas
Supreme Court. 253 Apart from the change in its scope, however, the rule
remains unaltered, and a party seeking to disqualify any judge must file a
motion for recusal at least ten days before the date set for hearing or trial.254
Rule 18b, an entirely new rule that was added in 1984, establishes a proce-
dure for recusing or disqualifying justices of the supreme court or the courts
of appeal. 255 A motion for disqualification of an appellate justice must be
filed within thirty days after a proceeding is filed in the appellate court.256
Copies of the motion must be served on all other parties or counsel on the
date that the motion is filed, "together with notice that movant expects the
motion to be presented to the justice ten (10) days after the filing of such
motion unless otherwise ordered by the justice. '257 Once a motion is prop-
erly filed and served, the justice against whom the motion is directed must
either recuse himself or certify the matter to the entire court for a decision
248. 666 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
249. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737h, § l(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (affidavit
sufficient evidence to support finding of necessity of services and reasonableness of charges).
250. 666 S.W.2d at 585.
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
252. See Novak v. Schellenberg, 669 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ) (prior to amendment TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a) limited to district judges); Rocha v. Ahmad,
662 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ) (no statutory provisions similar to
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1985), exist for motions to
disqualify appellate justices).
253. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a).
254. Id.
255. Id. 18b.
256. Id. 18b(a). The court, upon a showing of good cause, may allow a later filing of the
motion if it is grounded upon reasons not known during the prescribed thirty-day period. Id.
257. Id. 18b(b). Any other party may file an opposing or concurring statement at any time
before the motion is decided. Id.
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by a majority of the justices sitting en banc. 258 The justice who is challenged
does not participate in the court's en banc consideration. 259 A decision
granting the motion to recuse or disqualify is not reviewable; if the motion is
denied, however, the normal appeal process applies. 26 °
Three cases decided during the survey period provided courts with an op-
portunity to employ the new procedure described in rule 18b. In Manges v.
Guerra261 the Texas Supreme Court, upon rehearing, considered and re-
jected a motion to recuse that had been filed after the original judgment was
rendered. Since the decision makes no mention of the thirty-day filing pe-
riod, it is unclear whether the motion was grounded on new facts, which
were undiscovered by the movant earlier, or the court treated the motion for
rehearing as the filing of a proceeding that triggered a new thirty-day
period.262
Similarly, River Road Neighborhood Ass'n v. South Texas Sports, Inc.263
concerned a motion to recuse two justices of the court of appeals on the basis
that one justice had received 17.1% of the total reported contributions to his
campaign from one of the appellees and the second justice had received
21.7% of the total reported contributions to his campaign from appellees'
counsel. The challenged justices refused to recuse themselves and, in ac-
cordance with rule 18b, the matter was referred to the other five members of
the court for decision. Concluding that the receipt of campaign contribu-
tions by the two justices did not establish an interest on their part in the
outcome of the case, the remaining members of the court rejected the re-
quested disqualification. 264
The procedure used by the court of appeals to consider a recusal motion in
Rocha v. Ahmad 265 also conformed to the requirements of rule 18b, although
the new rule was not even proposed at the time the case was decided. The
prescient Rocha court reiterated that justices are not subject to disqualifica-
tion solely on the basis that they received campaign contributions from an
attorney representing one of the parties to the appeal. 26
6
Rule 18a also attracted the attention of some courts during the survey
period. In Greenberg, Fisk & Fielder v. Howell 267 the appellate court held
that a trial judge who is challenged by a motion to recuse may not himself
deny the motion because of alleged procedural insufficiency. 268 Acordingly,
the court granted a writ of mandamus requiring the trial judge to enter an
258. Id. 18b(c).
259. Id. If a majority of the justices are challenged, the court decides the motion as to each
justice one at a time. Each challenged justice is then excluded from the en banc consideration
of the motion only as to him. Id.
260. Id. 18b(d).
261. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
262. Id. at 183. The court details in its opinion the procedure it followed in considering the
motion, thereby suggesting that it did not simply deny the motion as untimely. Id.
263. 673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
264. Id. at 953.
265. 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
266. Id. at 78.
267. 676 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
268. Id. at 433.
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appropriate order either recusing himself or referring the motion to the pre-
siding judge of the administrative district for further treatment.269 The
court also granted the writ of prohibition requested by the petitioner to re-
strain the trial judge from presiding at the trial of the action, which was
promptly scheduled by the judge soon after the filing of the motion to
recuse.
2 70
Gonzalez v. Gonzale 271 reemphasized a well-recognized, but narrow, ex-
ception to the rule enunciated in Howell. If the motion to disqualify is not
timely filed, the trial judge may overrule it himself without requesting ap-
pointment of another district judge to hear the motion. 272
X. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Disciplinary Rule 5-101 provides that a lawyer shall not, unless one of
four exceptions applies, "accept employment in contemplated or pending lit-
igation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be
called as a witness. '2 73 If the necessity for testifying appears after the law-
yer has already undertaken the representation, the lawyer must withdraw
from the conduct of the trial.274 In two cases decided during the survey
period, courts held that a writ of mandamus will lie to correct a clear abuse
of discretion by the trial court in its enforcement of these rules.
The plaintiff in Bert Wheeler's, Inc. v. Ruffino 275 filed a motion to disqual-
ify the defendant's attorney, alleging that the attorney would be a witness in
the case. After a hearing in which the attorney acknowledged his intent to
appear as a witness in the case, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion.
The attorney later informed the trial court that he no longer intended to
appear as a witness in his client's case and sought reinstatement on that
basis. The plaintiff resisted the motion, declaring that it would call the de-
fendant's attorney as a witness, whereupon the court denied the motion to
reinstate the defendant's attorney. In denying the defendant's writ of man-
damus seeking to compel the attorney's reinstatement, the court of appeals
held that a trial court has a duty to enforce disciplinary rules. 2 76 The court
acknowledged, however, that a writ of mandamus would issue to correct a
clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in its enforcement of those
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 659 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
272. Id. at 901-02; see, e.g., Autry v. Autry, 646 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983,
no writ); Limon v. State, 632 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no
writ).
273. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, art.
XII, § 8 (Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 5-101(B) (1973) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
274. Id. DR 5-102(A).
275. 666 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
276. Id. at 513; see State Bar v. Edwards, 646 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial judge may not impose a sanction for attorney misconduct
not provided for in State Bar Rules).
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rules.2 7 7 The court nevertheless found no abuse of discretion since it was the
trial judge's duty to decide whether an exception to DR5-101 or DR5-102
existed under the attendant facts.2
78
Nearly identical facts were involved in United Pacific Insurance Co. v.
Zardenetta.279 In that case the appellate court found that the trial judge
abused his discretion in refusing to disqualify the plaintiffs attorney, whom
opposing counsel planned to call as a witness at trial. 280 The court also
frowned on efforts by the plaintiffs attorney to eliminate legitimate causes of
action belonging to his client in order to eliminate the need for his testimony
so he could remain in the case. 28 1 According to the appellate court, a client
cannot waive the application of DR 5-102(B), 28 2 and the trial court has
broad discretion in such circumstances to disqualify trial counsel if he re-
fuses to withdraw voluntarily.283 Moreover, the court considered it immate-
rial that the plaintiffs' attorney would no longer need to appear as a witness
on behalf of his client; the defendants intended to call the attorney as a wit-
ness in their case, and the prohibitions of DR 5-102 are not limited to attor-
neys testifying on behalf of their own clients.2 84
A different standard governs review of the trial court's decision on dis-
qualification if no relief in the appellate courts is sought until after the trial
on the merits. The appellant in Bullock v. Kehoe2 85 learned this fact when
he claimed error on appeal in the trial court's refusal to disqualify appellee's
law firm because several members of the firm were material witnesses in the
suit. Finding no indication in the record that the trial court's action harmed
appellant or caused the entry of an improper judgment, the appellate court
refused to consider whether the disciplinary rules had indeed been
violated. 286
Finally, in National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Jones2 8 7 the court held
that an attorney could represent a client in litigation against a former client
if the matters involved in the dispute were not substantially related to the
attorney's past representation of the former client. 288 Since the facts regard-
ing the relationship between the current and previous representation were
277. 666 S.W.2d at 512 (citing West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978); Crane v. Tunks,
160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959)).
278. 666 S.W.2d at 514-15.
279. 661 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
280. Id. at 246.
281. Id. at 247.
282. TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) provides that an at-
torney who learns that he may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client may
continue the representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client. Id.
283. 661 S.W.2d at 248.
284. Id. at 249. The court recognized, however, that the "mere announcement by an ad-
versary of his intention to call opposing counsel as a witness is insufficient to orchestrate coun-
sel's disqualification." Id. at 248. Instead, the party moving to disqualify opposing counsel
must demonstrate a genuine need for the attorney's testimony. Id.
285. 678 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
286. Id. at 560.
287. 670 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
288. Id. at 754; see Howard Hughes Med. Inst. v. Lummis, 596 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex. Civ.
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disputed, the court of appeals refused to issue the writ of mandamus, noting
that the relator could later challenge the trial court's decision on appeal. 28 9
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Unlike most of the other major rules governing pretrial procedure, the
summary judgment rule 290 escaped serious attention from those responsible
for the rule amendments that became effective on April 1, 1984. Apart from
minor additions to the types of evidence that may be considered by a trial
court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, rule 166-A remains
unchanged. 291
Summary judgment evidence was also a frequent concern among the
courts last year. For example, in Martens v. Prairie Producing Co. 2 9 2 the
court held that mere statements of opinion or conclusion about the other
party's state of mind were insufficient, even though sworn to, to raise an
issue of fact precluding summary judgment. 29 3 The affidavit filed by the
summary judgment opponent in Brownlee v. Brownlee294 was defective for
the same reason. 295 The court in Brownlee held that the affidavit was also
insufficient since its allegations were neither direct nor unequivocal, and
lacked the necessary factual specificity. 296 Finally, in reversing the trial
court's grant of a summary judgment, the court of appeals in Bryant v. INA
of Texas297 was able to rely on appellant's deposition, which was not filed
until four days before the summary judgment hearing. Because the sum-
mary judgment expressly recited that it was based in part on the trial court's
consideration of the deposition, the court of appeals opined that the late
filing occurred with leave of court.298 The court even considered hearsay
evidence contained in the deposition due to appellee's failure to register an
appropriate objection. 299
App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attorney disqualified if matters involved are substantially
related to the former representation).
289. 670 S.W.2d at 755.
290. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
291. Stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records, are now in-
cluded as matters which may be used to support or oppose a summary judgment. Id. 166-
A(c).
292. 668 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
293. Id. at 891; see Medina v. Sherrod, 391 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1965, no writ).
294. 665 S.W.2d III (Tex. 1984).
295. Id. at 112. The court held that an affidavit alleging contract modification contained
nothing more than a legal conclusion that was inadmissible as summary judgment evidence
under TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e). Id.
296. 665 S.W.2d at 112 (citing Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1975)).
297. 673 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, writ granted).
298. Id. at 694. The opponent's response in that case was also untimely although filed one
day earlier than the deposition, but the court of appeals concluded that it was filed without
leave of court since no mention of it was made in the judgment. Id.
299. Id. at 695. TEX. R. EvID. 802, effective Sept. 1, 1983, provides that inadmissible




Rule 277 expressly prohibits the submission of inferential rebuttal is-
sues.300 One of the classic examples of an inferential rebuttal issue is an
unavoidable accident issue in a negligence case. 301 In Lemos v. Montez 302
the supreme court considered whether the trial court had in effect submitted
an unavoidable accident issue in an automobile collision case. In this regard,
the trial court had submitted an issue that inquired of the jury as to whose
negligence proximately caused the collision in question. The jury was re-
quested to answer with one of the following: (a) the defendant; (b) the plain-
tiff; (c) both; or (d) neither. In response, the jury answered "neither."
Finding that the answer "neither" was tantamount to the submission of an
unavoidable accident issue and that it compelled the plaintiff to negate an
unavoidable accident, the supreme court concluded that the trial court had
erred by providing this answer as an alternative. 30 3 In addition, the trial
court in Lemos also instructed the jury that "[t]he mere happening of a colli-
sion. . . is not evidence of negligence. '"304 Finding that the instruction was
an impermissible comment that tended to "tilt or nudge" the jury, the
supreme court concluded that the instruction should not have been
submitted. 30 5
Rule 277 also provides that "[t]he court shall not in its charge comment
directly on the weight of the evidence or advise the jury of the effect of their
answers." 306 Claiming that the trial court had commented on the weight of
the evidence, the defendant in Alvarez v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad30 7
sought a reversal on that basis. The trial court had submitted a negligence
issue that inquired as to whether the defendant railroad was negligent (a) in
its speed, (b) in not timely applying the brakes, (c) in its lookout, or (d) in
failing to sound the train whistle or horn. On appeal, the court of appeals
concluded that the use of the words "in not timely applying" constituted an
impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence because of the inher-
ent assumption that the defendant had, indeed, not timely applied the
brakes.308 Although recognizing on subsequent review that the special issue
could have been better worded, the supreme court concluded that, even if
the wording of the issue constituted an implied comment, it was a harmless
one.3° 9 In support of its holding, the supreme court noted that it was undis-
300. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
301. See Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. 1971) (unavoidable accident
occurs when event was not proximately caused by negligence of any party).
302. 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
303. Id. at 801.
304. Id. at 799.
305. Id. at 801; see also Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Tex.
1984) (jury should not be burdened with surplus instructions); Gulf Coast State Bank v.
Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex. 1978) (not permissible for trial court to marshal party's
contentions in instructions or instruct jury to find for that party if they believed certain facts to
be true).
306. TEX. R. Civ.P. 277.
307. 683 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1984).
308. Id. at 377.
309. Id. at 378.
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puted that there was a delay in applying the brakes during the incident in
question and, considering the charge as a whole, the word "timely" was
merely mentioned in the body of the issue and did not necessarily cause the
jurors to treat the issue as an instruction that the defendant had not exer-
cised due care.310
In Acord v. General Motors Corp.3 11 the supreme court again discussed the
type of issues and instructions that should be submitted in a products liabil-
ity case.312 The trial court had asked the jury if the product in question was
defectively designed. On the basis of a prior supreme court decision, 31 3 the
jury was instructed that the term "defectively designed" meant "a product
that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the
utility of the product and the risk involved in its use."' 314 The trial court,
however, also added an instruction to the effect that: (1) the manufacturer is
not an insurer of the product he designs; (2) the law does not require that the
design be perfect or render the product accident proof or incapable of caus-
ing an injury; and (3) it is not necessary to incorporate the ultimate safety
features in a product. Although the additional instruction was a correct
statement of law, the supreme court concluded that such instruction
amounted to a comment on the weight of the evidence.3 1 5 Since the instruc-
tion stated that the defendant was neither an insurer nor a guarantor in a
closely contested case, the supreme court concluded that the instruction con-
stituted harmful error. 316
In addition to the foregoing, the Acord decision also contains a discussion
regarding preservation of error with respect to special issues and instruc-
tions. In this instance, the plaintiff had led off with his objections to the
charge; without any ruling thereon by the trial court, one of the defendants
immediately followed with his objections. At the conclusion of these objec-
tions, the trial court remarked "overruled." The supreme court concluded
that the plaintiff had preserved his objections to the jury charge because the
trial court did not sustain any of the objections made by either party and,
therefore, the "overruled" was assumed to apply to the objections of both
parties.3 17 The supreme court further noted the presumption under rule
272318 that objections were presented at the proper time and that the trial
court ruled on the objections, unless something in the record indicates to the
contrary. 31 9 Applying rule 272, the supreme court concluded that if an ob-
310. Id.
311. 669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984).
312. See Fleishman v. Guadiano, 651 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex. 1983) (jury instruction should
ask if product is defectively designed and not deflect jury's attention to any contributory negli-
gence); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851-52 (Tex. 1979) (jury may be
instructed that the product is defectively designed if it is unreasonably dangerous as designed,
taking into consideration the utility of the product and risk involved in its use).
313. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
314. 669 S.W.2d at 113.
315. Id. at 116.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 114.
318. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272.
319. 669 S.W.2d at 115.
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jection is articulated and the trial court makes no change to the charge, the
objection is deemed overruled.3 20 In comparison, the court in Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Boyett32' held that the defendant waived any error in the
charge when the trial court did not rule or comment on its objections.322
The court further held that the defendant's submission of requested issues
and instructions covering the same areas of objection, which were denied by
the trial court, did not preserve the error.323 In Dawson v. Garcia324 the trial
court improperly submitted a single issue inquiring into elements of damages
that were both recoverable and nonrecoverable. The counsel for defendant
objected because "the jury's finding as it's now arranged would be impossible
to divide with regard to what portion relates to nonrecoverable items and
damage and what-not. '3 25 The plaintiff, on appeal, contended that the de-
fendant had not pointed out distinctly the matter to which he objected in the
special issue as required by rule 274.326 Disagreeing, the court of appeals
concluded that the language of defendant's counsel in the context of this
particular trial was sufficient to comply with rule 274.327
Finally, rule 292 provides that a verdict may be rendered by the concur-
rence of the same ten members of the original jury of twelve persons. 328 In a
workers' compensation case, the court in McCawley v. Charter Oak Fire In-
surance CO. 3 2 9 had the opportunity to apply the provisions of rule 292. In
this case, the jury was asked in the first two issues to determine whether
(1) the plaintiff had received an injury, and (2) whether he received such
injury in the course of his employment with the defendant. Conditioned on
affirmative answers to the first two issues, the jury was then asked whether
the injury was (3) a producing cause of any total incapacity, and (4) whether
the injury was a producing cause of any partial incapacity. In response, ten
of the jurors found in the affirmative with respect to the first two issues. Ten
different jurors found in favor of the defendant with respect to the third and
fourth issues. On appeal, the defendant contended that, irrespective of
whether the same ten jurors agreed to all the issues submitted, the error was
harmless because answers to the first two issues were immaterial. Disagree-
ing with that conclusion, the court of appeals held that the first two issues
were material because they were conditions precedent to the jury's answer-
ing the remaining issues and rule 292 imposes a mandatory requirement that
the same ten jurors answer all of the issues. 330
320. Id. at 114. To the extent they were contrary, the court overruled its decisions in
Cosburn v. Harbour, 657 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1983), and Hernandez v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 652 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1983).
321. 674 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
322. Id. at 789.
323. Id. at 788.
324. 666 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
325. Id. at 261.
326. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
327. 666 S.W.2d at 261.
328. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
329. 660 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




As most trial attorneys are aware, the number of peremptory challenges
that are available in multiple party suits depends upon the alignment of the
parties. Previously, the principles governing the alignment of the parties and
the peremptory challenges available in multiparty cases were specified pri-
marily by the case law.331 The applicable procedural rule, however, was
amended to codify those decisions. Rule 233 now provides that, in multiple
party cases, the trial court first is to decide whether any of the litigants
aligned on the same side of the docket are antagonistic with respect to any
issue to be submitted to the jury. 332 As used in the rule, the term "side" is
not synonymous with party, litigant, or person.3 33 Instead, the term "side"
means one or more litigants who have common interests on the matters with
which the jury is concerned. 334 Upon motion of any litigant made prior to
the exercise of peremptory challenges, the trial court has the duty to equalize
the number of peremptory challenges so that no litigant or side is given an
unfair advantage "as a result of the alignment of the litigants and the award
of peremptory challenges to each litigant or side."'335 In determining the
allocation of peremptory challenges, the trial court is required to consider
any matter brought to its attention "concerning the ends of justice and the
elimination of an unfair advantage. '336
Jury misconduct was the subject of two decisions during the survey pe-
riod. In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Watson337 two jurors were in effect
excluded from further deliberations after they had voted contrary to the ma-
jority of the jurors on another issue. Finding that the appellant was entitled
to have the benefits of the opinions and votes of the excluded jurors, the Fort
Worth court of appeals held that the exclusion of the jurors was misconduct
and warranted a new trial.338 In Living, Inc. v. Redinger,339 a personal in-
jury case, five jurors discussed liability insurance, the financial ability of a
defendant to pay his share of the judgment, and the manner in which attor-
ney fees would be paid. Concluding that these discussions constituted mate-
rial misconduct and probably resulted in harm to the defendants, the
Houston court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial. 34° Although
the improper discussions only occurred in connection with the jury's deter-
mination of issues related to damages, the court of appeals decided that the
331. E.g., Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. 1979) (party to lawsuit
must show antagonistic interests to use peremptory strike); Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493
S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1973) (party to lawsuit not automatically entitled to six peremptory
strikes of jurors).





337. 656 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
338. Id. at 616-17.
339. 667 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ granted).
340. Id. at 854; see also White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 102, 203 S.W.2d 200, 202-03




entire action must be retried. 341
Many prior jury misconduct decisions, including those mentioned above,
focused on discussions that occurred during deliberations. 342 In the future,
however, jury misconduct may be difficult or impossible to establish on the
basis of statements made during the course of the jury's deliberation. Rule
327343 was amended to incorporate the provisions of rule 606(b) 344 of the
Texas Rules of Evidence. Under amended rule 327 and evidence rule
606(b), a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement that occurred
during the course of the jury's deliberations. Further, a juror may not testify
as to the effect of anything upon his or another juror's mind or emotions "as
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict concerning his
mental processes in connection therewith. ' 345 A juror may, however, testify
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any ju-
ror. Finally, amended rule 327 also provides that when jury misconduct is a
ground for a motion for new trial, an affidavit must support the misconduct
before the trial judge is required to conduct a hearing on the issue. 346
In a wrongful death action, the defendant in Gulf State Utilities Co. v.
Reed347 sought to ask prospective jurors during voir dire if they knew plain-
tiff by any of her former married names. The trial court refused to allow the
inquiry, and, on appeal, the court of appeals determined that the trial court
was correct. 348 In this connection, the appellate court noted that the scope
of voir dire is subject to the trial court's discretion 349 and the prejudicial
effect of introducing the plaintiff by several former names "could be easily
perceived as outweighing any benefits to [defendants] during voir dire." 350
As noted in the last Survey, 35' the supreme court has concluded that the
trial court is required to send all exhibits admitted into evidence to the jury
room during the deliberations. 35 2 In addition to this holding, rule 281 now
provides that the jury on request shall take with them the charge and any
written evidence, except depositions of witnesses and special issues that have
been refused.353 Finally, the jury "foreman" no longer exists under Texas
practice. In apparent deference to the women's liberation movement, rule
280 now requires that the jury appoint one of their body as "presiding
341. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 434.
342. Indeed, a leading supreme court decision on jury misconduct, Flores v. Dosher, 622
S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1981), was concerned with a juror's statements made during deliberations.
343. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327.
344. TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
345. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
346. Id. 327(a).
347. 659 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
348. Id. at 855.
349. Id. at 853; see Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch, 538 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial judge's discretion as to voir dire will only be re-
viewed if clearly abused); Johnson v. Reed, 464 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (voir dire is not unlimited).
350. 659 S.W.2d at 855-56.
351. 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 452.
352. First Employees Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 646 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. 1983).
353. TEX. R. Civ. P. 281.
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juror. " 3 5 4
XIV. JUDGMENTS, DISMISSALS, AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In an apparent effort to avoid unfairness to parties who do not receive
notice of judgments, rule 306a 355 was amended to provide that the clerk
shall immediately give notice of the signing of a final judgment or other
appealable order to the parties or their attorneys by mail.35 6 If, within
twenty days after the judgment or other appealable order is signed, neither
the party nor his attorney has received such notice from the clerk or ac-
quired actual knowledge of the judgment or order, then the appeal period for
that party begins on the date he or his attorney receives notice or acquires
actual knowledge of the signing, whichever occurs first. 357 In no event, how-
ever, is the appeal period to begin more than ninety days after the original
judgment or other appealable order is signed. In order to extend the period
of appeal based on a lack of notice, the adversely affected party is required to
prove in the trial court, by sworn motion, the date on which the party or his
attorney first received notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge
of its signing and that the date was more than twenty days after the judg-
ment was signed.358
Previously, a motion for new trial was a prerequisite to a point of error on
appeal regarding jury misconduct, newly discovered evidence, or the failure
to set aside a default judgment.359 In addition to these grounds, rule 324
now specifies that a motion for new trial is also a prerequisite to complaints
on appeal regarding the factual insufficiency of evidence to support a jury
finding, a jury finding that is against the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence, the inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages found by the jury,
and incurable jury argument, if not otherwise ruled upon by the trial
court. 36
Rule 329b provides that a motion for new trial, if not determined by writ-
ten order signed within seventy-five days after the judgment is signed, is con-
sidered to be overruled by operation of law.3 6 1 The same rule further
provides that a motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment is also over-
ruled by operation of law if not determined by the trial court within seventy-
five days after the judgment is signed. 362 In Taack v. McFal1361 the supreme
court applied the provisions of rule 329b to a motion for new trial. In that
case the trial court entered a divorce decree on October 8, 1982. The defend-






359. Tex. R. Civ. P. 324 (1962) (amended 1984).
360. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b).
361. Id. 329b(c).
362. Id.
363. 661 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1983).
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3, 1982. At that time, the trial court orally granted the defendant's motion
for new trial and noted the action on its docket sheet. The trial court, how-
ever, did not enter a written order granting the motion for new trial. Find-
ing that the trial court's oral pronouncement and docket entry did not
substitute for a written order as required by rule 329b, the supreme court
concluded that the motion for new trial was in fact overruled by operation of
law within seventy-five days after the divorce decree was signed, and the
judgment became final thirty days later. 364
In Newman Oil Co. v. Alkek 365 plaintiff filed a timely motion for nonsuit,
but the trial court did not enter an order of dismissal. Subsequent to the
filing of the motion for nonsuit, a summary judgment was entered in favor of
the defendant. The court of appeals, however, held that the trial court was
not authorized to rule on the summary judgment motion and had lost juris-
diction of the entire case when the motion for nonsuit was filed. 366 With
respect to nonsuits, rule 164 was amended to provide that, when a motion
for sanctions is pending or an order imposing sanctions has been entered, the
taking of a nonsuit shall have no effect upon liability for sanctions. 367
XV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Although the rules governing appellate procedure sustained no major
changes, the supreme court did make several revisions worthy of note. The
amount of a cost bond or cash deposit necessary to perfect an appeal has
been increased to $1,000.368 Previously, rule 354 provided that the amount
of the bond or deposit could be increased on the motion of any party or by
any officer of the court.369 Pursuant to an amendment, the trial court on its
own motion may also increase or decrease the amount of the bond or deposit
required.370 Further, rule 354 now specifies that the failure of appellant's
counsel to give notification of the filing of a cost bond or certificate of deposit
shall be grounds for dismissal of the appeal or other appropriate action if
appellee is prejudiced by such failure. 371 Finally, in an apparent effort to
ensure that court reporters are paid for their services, rule 354(e) imposes an
obligation upon the appellant either to pay or make arrangements to pay the
court reporter upon completion and delivery of the statement of facts, even if
a cost bond is filed or deposit in lieu of a bond is made. 372
Rule 364, 37 3 which governs the procedure for superseding a judgment
364. Id. at 924.
365. 657 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
366. Id. at 920.
367. TEX. R. Civ. P. 164.
368. Id. 354(a), (b).
369. Tex. R. Civ. P. 354 (Vernon 1962).
370. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354(c).
371. Id. 354(d).
372. Id. 354(e). Rule 354(e) apparently overturns decisions that had held that a court
reporter must prepare a statement of facts upon request and cannot insist upon payment as a
condition when a cost bond has been filed. See, e.g., Fine v. Page, 572 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ dism'd).
373. TEX. R. Civ. P. 364.
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during appeal, now allows the trial court to decline to permit certain types of
judgments to be suspended during an appeal. 374 Those types of judgments
are ones for "other than money or property or foreclosure. '375 An amend-
ment to rule 465376 states that the sufficiency of a cost or supersedeas bond
and deposit shall be reviewable by the appellate court for excessiveness as
well as, under the prior rule, for insufficiency. 377
Rule 376 provides that a party may designate the filed papers to be in-
cluded in the transcript on appeal. 378 Pursuant to an amendment, the same
rule specifies that the clerk shall disregard any general designation by a
party, such as one for all papers filed in the cause. 379 In addition, the
amended rule also imposes a mandatory obligation upon the clerk to prepare
a transcript without waiting for any designation by the parties.38 0 With re-
spect to the statement of facts, rule 377, as amended, requires the appellant
at or before the time prescribed for perfecting an appeal to make a written
request to the court reporter for the statement of facts. 38 1 Applying
amended rule 377, the San Antonio court of appeals in Odom v. Olafson382
concluded that the appellant could not obtain an extension for the filing of a
statement of facts because he did not make a request to the court reporter for
the statement of facts prior to the time prescribed for perfecting the
appeal.383
Previously, the rules had contained no specific provision regarding the ef-
fect of filing a premature appeal. New rule 377a 384 was promulgated to
cover this subject. The rule specifies that proceedings related to an appeal
will not be considered ineffective due to prematurity "if a subsequent appeal-
able order has been signed to which the premature proceedings may properly
be applied. ' 385 In connection with appeals that are premature due to the
lack of a final order, the appellate court may permit the defects to be cured
and any subsequent proceedings to be shown in a supplemental record. 38 6 If
the trial court signs an order modifying, correcting, or reforming an order
from which an appeal has been taken or has vacated that type of order and
signed another, rule 377a states that proceedings related to the appeal of the
first order may be considered applicable to the second but "shall not prevent
any party from appealing from the second order." 38 7
The time period has been changed for perfecting an appeal from an inter-









382. 675 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd).
383. Id. at 582.






within twenty days after the judgment or order is signed by the trial
court.388 In addition, new rule 385b3 89 now clarifies a number of points
concerning the effect of an interlocutory appeal. First, no order denying
interlocutory relief is suspended or superseded by an appeal.3 90 The pen-
dency of an appeal, however, from an order certifying a class action does
operate to suspend that order and also the trial on the merits. Except for an
order certifying a class action, the mere pendency of an appeal alone from an
order granting interlocutory relief will not suspend the operation of the or-
der. The trial court, however, may permit an interlocutory order to be sus-
pended pending an appeal by the filing of a supersedeas bond or by making
an equivalent cash deposit. 391 During an appeal from an interlocutory or-
der, the trial court continues to have jurisdiction over the action and may
issue further orders, including dissolution of the order appealed from, but
the trial court may not enter: (1) an order granting substantially the same
relief as that granted by the order appealed from; (2) an order contrary to
temporary orders of the appellate court; or (3) an order that would interfere
with or impair the effectiveness of any relief sought or granted on appeal.392
The trial court is authorized to proceed with the trial on the merits, except
for cases in which a class action is certified. With respect to enforcement of
temporary orders that are the subject of appeal, those orders may be en-
forced only by the appellate court in which the appeal is pending, except that
the appellate court may refer any enforcement proceeding to the trial
court.393 The disposition by the appellate court of an interlocutory appeal
takes effect when the mandate is issued. 394 The court of appeals may issue
the mandate immediately on announcing its decision or it may delay the
mandate until final disposition of the appeal. With respect to a rehearing,
the appellate court has the discretion to deny the right to file a motion for
rehearing or to shorten the time for filing. If the appellate court takes that
action, then the motion for rehearing shall not be a prerequisite to any re-
view available in the supreme court.395
Rule 386396 was amended to conform with the supreme court's decision in
B.D. Click v. Safari Drilling Corp.3 9 7 As noted in a prior survey,398 the Click
decision held that a court of appeals does not have authority to grant a mo-
tion to extend the time for filing of the record in the absence of a timely rule
21c motion. Rule 386 specifies that the court of appeals "shall have no au-










397. 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982).
398. 1983 Annual Survey, supra note 73, at 319.
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mitted by rule 21c." 399 Considering an analogous issue, the court in Better
Construction, Inc. v. HE. Reeves, Inc.4°° held that, when a third motion for
extension to file the statement of facts was not made on a timely basis in
accordance with rule 21c, 401 the court of appeals had no authority to grant
an extension for a third time. 402
Rule 413 was rewritten to clarify that the burden is on the appellant, or
other parties seeking review, to see that a sufficient record is provided to
show error requiring reversal. 403 With respect to oral argument in the court
of appeals, rule 423 now specifies a uniform time limit.4°4 Formerly, the
time limits depended upon the local rules of each court of appeals. Under
amended rule 423, each side is allowed thirty minutes in argument, with
fifteen more minutes for rebuttal by the appellant; in cases involving difficult
questions, the time limit may be extended, provided application is made
before argument begins. 4° 5
The practice regarding certification of questions of law from the court of
appeals to the supreme court has also been modified. Under rule 461, the
court of appeals may certify one or more controlling questions of law to the
supreme court "[i]n exceptional cases urgently requiring accelerated disposi-
tion on the appeal. ' '406 The supreme court may of course decline to decide
the certified question. In connection with motions to certify questions of law
to the supreme court, rule 462 specifies that such motions must be made
within fifteen days after the judgment in the court of appeals rather than on
the date the motion for rehearing is overruled.40 7
Certain changes were also made to the rules governing supreme court
practice. Amended rule 469 permits, to some extent, broader points of error
to be presented to the supreme court.4°8 The new provision in rule 469
specifies that "[p]oints will be sufficient if they direct the attention of the
court to the error relied upon," and "[c]omplaints about several issues or
findings related to one element of recovery or defense may be combined in
one point, if separate record references are made."'4 9 Rule 496 provides
that briefs in response to applications of writ of error shall follow the general
form of the requirements for the application. 410 The respondent, however,
may rely upon his brief in the court of appeals and, in that event, he is
responsible for filing twelve copies of such brief with the clerk of the
399. TEX. R. COv. P. 386.
400. 675 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
401. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c.
402. 675 S.W.2d at 613. Contra Gibraltar Savings Ass'n v. Hamilton Air Mart, Inc., 662
S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (court has jurisdiction to consider second
motion for an extension even though filed 15 days after time allowed).










supreme court.411 In connection with oral argument, rule 498 permits the
supreme court to shorten the time for oral argument and also align the par-
ties for purposes of presenting oral argument. 412 Rule 498 also contains a
new provision governing argument by amicus curiae and, in general, the rule
provides that counsel for amicus curiae may not present oral argument, ex-
cept if one of the parties to the case agrees to share oral argument time and if
leave of court is obtained.413
A number of decisions considered questions related to the preservation by
an appellee of cross-points of error. In Cameron County v. Velasquez414 the
appellee, by cross-point, attacked the constitutionality of the Texas Tort
Claims Act.415 Recognizing that to preserve a cross-point the appellee must
have in some manner apprised the trial court of his dissatisfaction with the
judgment,4 16 the court of appeals decided that the cross-point could not be
considered in light of appellee's lack of exception to the trial court's judg-
ment.4 17 Reaching a similar result, the court in Stendebach v. Campbell418
held that the plaintiff-appellee could not attack a directed verdict in favor of
one of the defendants due to the lack of an objection or exception by appellee
to the judgment. 419 In contrast to the above decisions, the appellee in Texas
Employers Insurance Association v. Perez420 did preserve his cross-point for
appellate review. Claiming that the trial court erred in failing to accumulate
damage awards for his injuries, the plaintiff-appellee submitted a proposed
form of judgment that granted such cumulative relief. The appellate court
found that the submission of the proposed form of judgment sufficiently ap-
prised the trial court of appellee's request for a cumulative award and
thereby preserved the cross-point for appellate consideration.421
Considering an issue of first impression in Texas, Taliaferro v. Texas Com-




414. 668 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
415. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1983).
416. 668 S.W.2d at 781; see Saenz Motors v. Big H. Auto Auction, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 521,
522 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983) (court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider cross-
point when appellee failed to apprise trial court of objection), afftd, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.
1984); Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fisher, 653 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (appellee must apprise trial court of his dissatisfaction to preserve
appeal of cross-point).
417. 668 S.W.2d at 781.
418. 665 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
419. Id. at 560.
420. 673 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
421. Id. at 673.
422. 660 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
423. Id. at 154; cf. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190 F.2d 334, 335 (2d Cir.
1951) (interpleaded action is appealable once a final order has been made); Newkirk Constr.
Corp. v. Gulf County, 366 So. 2d 813, 819 (Fla. App. 1979) (final judgment in interpleader
action is appealable by all parties); Lafayette-South Side Bank & Trust v. Siefert, 233 Mo. App.
431, 18 S.W.2d 572, 574 (1929) (bill of interpleader could be appealed); Strassen v. Commer-
cial Nat'l Bank, 60 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Neb. 1953) (order granting interpleader is final and
appealable); National Bank v. White, 93 N.J. Eq. 109, 115 A. 533, 534 (1921) (interlocutory
decree in an interpleader suit is final between complainant and defendants).
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case, the judgment appealed from was one which (1) granted a bill of inter-
pleader, (2) allowed certain interpleading banks to deposit the proceeds of
accounts in the court's registry, (3) awarded attorneys' fees to the banks, and
(4) dismissed them from the suit. The court of appeals concluded that, once
the bill of interpleader was granted, the only real controverted issue that
affected the interpleading banks had been finally adjudicated. 4 24 There was
thus a final, appealable judgment. 425 With respect to the finality of judg-
ments for appeal purposes, Baker v. Hansen4 26 should also be considered. In
this landlord-tenant dispute, the tenant sued the landlord for damages under
several theories. The landlord counterclaimed for rent and other monetary
relief. The trial court dismissed the tenant's claims for affirmative relief be-
cause of her failure to comply with a ruling requiring her to post security for
costs. 4 2 7 Since the order of dismissal did not dispose of the landlord's coun-
terclaims, the supreme court ruled that the order was interlocutory and
could not provide the basis for appeal. 428
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
Local Rules. The courts of appeals and district and county courts have the
authority to enact local rules governing their practice that are not inconsis-
tent with the rules of civil procedure. 429 Pursuant to an amendment, rule 3a
now requires that such local rules be approved by the supreme court.430
Continuance. Rule 252 specifies that when the ground for a motion for con-
tinuance is based on a want of testimony, the applying party is required,
among other things, to show his due diligence in attempting to procure such
testimony.43' A recent addition to rule 252 clarifies that the failure to obtain
a deposition of a witness residing within a hundred miles of the courthouse
in which the suit is pending "shall not be regarded as want of diligence when
diligence has been used to secure the personal attendance of such wit-
ness."1432 The rule further provides, however, that if such a witness is dis-
abled from attending trial, then the failure to obtain a deposition of such
witness may in fact be regarded as a want of diligence.4 33
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Rule 297 formerly provided that,
when demand was made, the trial court was required to prepare and file its
findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty days after the judgment
424. 660 S.W.2d at 155; see Fisher v. Williams, 160 Tex. 342, 344, 331 S.W.2d 210, 213
(1960).
425. 660 S.W.2d at 155.
426. 679 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1984).
427. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 143.
428. 679 S.W.2d at 481; accord Steeple Oil & Gas Corp. v. Amend, 394 S.W.2d 789, 790
(Tex. 1965); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 551, 324
S.W.2d 200, 202 (1959).







or order overruling a motion for new trial was signed or the motion was
overruled by operation of law.434 As amended, rule 297 now specifies that
the trial court is required to prepare and file its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law within thirty days after the judgment is signed.435
Res Judicata. Reese v. Reese436 considered the effect of a judgment entered
in a forcible detainer proceeding on the prosecution of a subsequent trespass
to try title suit in district court. In this case, the plaintiffs filed a trespass to
try title suit, alleging they held fee simple title in a house and that the de-
fendant unlawfully entered into possession of the premises. In response, the
defendant claimed that a final judgment in a prior forcible detainer suit in
her favor had adjudicated the issue of possession. Although stating that the
judgment in the prior forcible detainer proceeding would bar another suit in
the justice court for possession of the same premises, the court of appeals
concluded that such judgment did not preclude relitigation of the issue of
possession in the district court.437
434. Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (Vernon 1977) (amended 1981).
435. TEX. R. Civ. P. 297.
436, 672 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, no writ).
437. Id. at 2-3; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226a (Vernon Supp. 1985) (determi-
nation of law in justice of the peace court shall not constitute basis for estoppel in district
court).
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